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I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2003, the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, invited
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate the
Lord’s Resistance Army’s (LRA) commission of serious international
crimes.1 The referral followed almost two decades of conflict between the
Ugandan army and LRA forces, several failed peace negotiations, and offers
of domestic amnesty to the LRA rebels.2 Interestingly, Uganda’s “selfreferral”3 and the consequent threat to arrest, detain, and hand over the
leaders of the LRA for trial at the ICC, appear to have produced a new
willingness on the part of the rebels to negotiate peace.4 As a precursor to
signing a comprehensive peace agreement, the LRA rebels agreed to submit
to domestic accountability processes if the ICC warrants were dropped.5 In
2007 and 2008, the Ugandan government and LRA rebels concluded two
important agreements, which called for domestic accountability for the
LRA’s crimes through the establishment of a national court to prosecute
alleged perpetrators of serious international crimes.6 Because these

1
Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, President of Uganda Refers Situation Concerning the
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC (Jan. 29, 2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi.
int/Menus/ICC/Press+and+Media/Press+Releases/ (follow “Press Releases (2004)” hyperlink;
then follow by date).
2
Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Accountability of Non-State Actors in Uganda for War Crimes and
Human Rights Violations: Between Amnesty and the International Criminal Court, 10 J.
CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 405, 405–07 (2005); Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, Note and Comment,
The ICC Arrest Warrants for the Lord’s Resistance Army Leaders and Peace Prospects for
Northern Uganda, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 179, 183–84 (2006).
3
The notion of “self-referral” derives from Article 14 of the Rome Statute. Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court art. 14, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome
Statute]. For a discussion of its history and significance in the context of the ICC’s work, see
Payam Akhavan, Self-Referrals Before the International Criminal Court: Are States the
Villains or the Victims of Atrocities?, 21 CRIM. L.F. 103 (2010).
4
Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, Note and Comment, The ICC’s Possible Deferral of the LRA
Case to Uganda, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 801, 802 (2008).
5
Id. at 804–05.
6
Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, Uganda-Lord’s Resistance Army, June
29, 2007 [hereinafter Agreement], available at http://www.beyondjuba.org/BJP1/peace_agreem
ents/Agreement_on_Accountability_And_Reconcilition.pdf; Annexure to the Agreement on
Accountability and Reconciliation, Uganda-Lord’s Resistance Army, Feb. 19, 2008 [hereinafter
Annexure], available at http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/documents/Annexure_to_agreement_
on_Accountability_signed_today.pdf. The Agreement was negotiated between the Government
of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army, under the mediation of General Riek Machar TenyDhurgon, Vice President of the Government of South Sudan. It was witnessed by the
Governments of the Republic of Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania. Agreement,
supra.
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agreements provided for domestic criminal prosecutions and traditional
justice, questions have arisen about the continued admissibility of the LRA
case before the ICC. This is due to the application of the principle of
complementarity, under which the primary responsibility for investigating
and prosecuting crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC falls to States,
while the Court provides an alternative forum where national jurisdictions do
not investigate or prosecute.7
This Article discusses the impact of the domestic political and legal
developments on the admissibility of the LRA case. It challenges the
suitability of a formal textual approach to determining admissibility and
suggests that, given the delicate legal and political context of the Ugandan
situation, it would be inappropriate to base the forum choice exclusively on
the strict letter of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (the
Rome Statute).8
Given the competing claims of advocates of “peace without justice” and
“justice without peace,”9 this Article asserts that a strict retributive justice
approach10 is unsuitable for the Ugandan situation. The Article does not aim
to rekindle the age-old debate that posits that peace and justice are polar
opposites. However, to set the stage for the ensuing discussion regarding the
most appropriate forum to try the LRA leadership, this Article recognizes
that it would be untenable to pursue justice in its Western, international
incarnation, without regard for the wishes and aspirations of the people most
directly affected by the Ugandan internal conflict.
The views of the people of Uganda, especially victims from the Acholi
community in the northern part of the country,11 regarding the various means
by which those allegedly responsible for the most serious crimes in Northern
Uganda could be held accountable, must be taken seriously. For example,
the argument that traditional accountability processes may be more suitable
7

The preamble to the Rome Statute, supra note 3, notes the duty of every State to exercise
its jurisdiction over alleged perpetrators of international crimes, and that the ICC shall be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. Article 1 of the Rome Statute also provides
that the ICC shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. Id. art. 1.
8
Id.
9
Eric Blumenson, The Challenge of a Global Standard of Justice: Peace, Pluralism, and
Punishment at the International Criminal Court, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 801, 804
(2006).
10
Id. at 819. In this context, the retributive justice claim is based on the argument that
those who commit crime deserve punishment “as a moral imperative,” or alternatively, on the
argument that the ICC has an institutional mandate to prosecute perpetrators of serious
international crimes. Id.
11
The Acholi community is the community most affected by the LRA. See infra notes
106–08, 115–17 and accompanying text.

2011]

UNLOCKING THE MYSTERIOUSNESS OF COMPLEMENTARITY

71

for communal reconciliation and lasting peace should not be taken lightly or
set aside. After all, the best form of “justice” for a population that has been
subjected to over two decades of brutal violence is peace—a peace that
enables them to return to their homes, to resume farming for their food, to
rear their animals, to bring up their children, and to make day-to-day choices
in life as a dignified people.12 To insist on justice at the ICC, irrespective of
how that might impact efforts to find a durable peace in Uganda, risks
defeating the goals of both peace and justice. Therefore, this Article
suggests that a decision on the most appropriate forum for the LRA trial must
not only be informed by the legal and moral imperatives to try Joseph Kony13
and the other LRA leaders for the serious crimes for which they have been
accused and the numerous victims in Northern Uganda, but also take into
account how the forum choice might affect other goals, such as peace, victim
participation in the justice process, deterrence, and legitimacy of the trial.
This Article ultimately suggests a consequentialist approach14 to the
question of forum choice. It concludes that, in theory, Uganda-based trials
offer the best prospect of attaining both peace and justice. However, it also
recognizes that this option will remain illusory unless Uganda overcomes its
two decade-long inability to arrest the LRA leadership or to peacefully
convince them to surrender. In addition, if and when the LRA leadership is
arrested or surrenders, and Uganda chooses to embark on a domestic
accountability process, the country must do more to bring about genuine and
credible prosecutions that meet international standards.
This Article is organized as follows: Part II provides background
necessary to understand Uganda’s referral to the ICC; Part III discusses the
law and jurisprudence on complementarity and admissibility under the Rome
Statute; Part IV addresses the legal developments in Uganda that are relevant
to a future domestic trial of the LRA leadership; Part V makes arguments in
support of domestic prosecution of the LRA, given the equally important
12

See Moses Chrispus Okello, Head, Research & Advocacy Dep’t, Refugee Law Project,
Address at the International Conference on Peace and Justice: The False Polarisation of Peace
and Justice in Uganda, at 4 (June 25–27, 2007), available at http://www.peace-justice-confere
nce.info/download/WS-2-Expert%20Paper-Okello.pdf (arguing that “the greatest justice one
can deliver to a people living in conflict is to enable them to enjoy some sort of peace and
enable them to have a say in how they think justice should be done—and to whom”).
13
Joseph Kony is the alleged founder and leader (Chairman and Commander in Chief) of
the LRA. Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-53, Warrant of Arrest,
para. 7 (as amended Sept. 27, 2005), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97185.PDF.
14
A consequentialist approach holds that “crimes of this magnitude must be punished in
order to prevent their recurrence through deterrent, incapacitative, or norm-reinforcing effects
of punishment.” Blumenson, supra note 9, at 819.
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goals of justice and peace; Part VI draws lessons from the referral
jurisprudence of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) that could arguably guide Uganda’s national trials of the
LRA; Part VII sets out procedural options available to Uganda under the
Rome Statute and the ICC system of justice, if the country wishes to
challenge the admissibility of the LRA case before the ICC; and Part VIII
provides a few concluding remarks.
II. FACTUAL CONTEXT OF THE REFERRAL
Uganda’s self-referral under Articles 13(a) and 14 of the Rome Statute
invited the ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, to investigate serious
international crimes allegedly committed by members of the LRA during the
twenty years of internal armed conflict that commenced in 1986.15 In July
2004, the ICC Prosecutor “determined that there [was] a reasonable basis to
open an investigation into the situation concerning Northern Uganda,”16 and
he applied to Pre-Trial Chamber II17 for arrest warrants against five top
leaders of the LRA.18 The warrants, which were issued in July 2005 and
15

Press Release, supra note 1; Apuuli, supra note 2, at 179–80. The issue of whether the
Rome Statue permits self-referrals remains a contested one. Payam Akhavan suggests that,
despite the complementarity principle, nothing in the Rome Statute or its negotiating history
prohibits such referrals and notes that there may be domestic circumstances that justify turning
to the ICC in exceptional situations. Payam Akhavan, The Lord’s Resistance Army Case:
Uganda’s Submission of the First State Referral to the International Criminal Court, 99 AM.
J. INT’L L. 403, 414 (2005). On the other hand, Arsanjani and Reisman argue that during the
Rome Treaty negotiations, no one envisaged the possibility that governments would want to
invite the ICC to investigate and prosecute crimes that occurred on their territory and that,
therefore, no provision was made to cover this eventuality. Mahnoush H. Arsanjani & W.
Michael Reisman, The Law-in-Action of the International Criminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT’L L.
385, 386–87 (2005). However, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber has endorsed the legality of selfreferrals by accepting them from three African countries—Uganda, the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, and the Central African Republic. Andreas Th. Müller & Ignaz Stegmiller, SelfReferrals on Trial: From Panacea to Patient, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1267, 1268 (2010).
16
Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Opens
an Investigation into Northern Uganda (July 29, 2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/M
enus/ICC/Press+and+Media/Press+Releases/ (follow “Press Releases (2004)” hyperlink; then
follow by date).
17
There are two chambers in the Pre-Trial Division of the ICC, each assigned to particular
cases, that “play[ ] an important role in the first phase of judicial proceedings until the
confirmation of charges upon which the Prosecutor intends to seek trial against the person
charged.” Pre-Trial Division, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/structure%20of
%20the%20court/chambers/pre%20trial%20division/pre%20trial%20division?lan=en-GB (last
visited Nov. 11, 2011).
18
Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, Warrant of Arrest Unsealed Against Five LRA
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made public three months later, charged Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot
Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, and Raska Lukwiya with multiple counts of
crimes against humanity and war crimes.19 These include murder, rape,
pillage, enslavement, sexual slavery, cruel treatment, enlisting children in
armed conflict, and attacks against the civilian population.20
Uganda’s referral, however, did not prevent it from continuing to
negotiate with the LRA for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.21 This was
due to the view of a sizeable part of the victim population in Northern
Uganda, including religious and traditional leaders and members of
Parliament, that the ICC referral could give further impetus to the war and
provoke reprisal attacks by the LRA against those perceived to support the
government in Kampala, Uganda’s capital.22 In addition, the government’s
peace initiative was a realistic acknowledgement of its inability to arrest
Joseph Kony and the LRA leadership for nearly two decades. Given the
government’s inability to arrest the LRA or otherwise bring the conflict to an
end, a comprehensive peace agreement that would encourage the voluntary
surrender of LRA members was therefore deemed a reasonable or pragmatic
option, especially when combined with processes for domestic
accountability.23
In 2007 and 2008, the Ugandan government and the LRA adopted two
important agreements, which provided for national, instead of international,
trials of war-related crimes.24 Following the conclusion of these agreements,
several Ugandan government officials, including President Museveni,
suggested that the LRA case would no longer be admissible at the ICC, that
Kony would be tried in Uganda, and that the government could ask the ICC
to withdraw the arrest warrants.25 However, as discussed in detail in the next
Commanders (Oct. 14, 2005), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Press+and+Med
ia/Press+Releases/ (follow “Press Releases (2005)” hyperlink; then follow by date).
19
Id.
20
Id. Kony and Otti are each sought for 33 and 32 counts, respectively, of war crimes and
crimes against humanity; Odhiambo faces 10 counts; Ongwen 7 counts; and Lukwiya 4
counts. Id. On July 11, 2007, the Pre-Trial Chamber terminated proceedings against Lukwiya
after receiving confirmation of his death. Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Case No. ICC-02/0401/05-248, Decision to Terminate the Proceedings Against Raska Lukwiya (July 11, 2007),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc297945.PDF.
21
Apuuli, supra note 2, at 183–85.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 183–84.
24
See Agreement, supra note 6; Annexure, supra note 6.
25
Uganda: Interview with President Yoweri Museveni, INTEGRATED REG’L INFO. NETWORKS
(June 9, 2005), http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=54853. President Museveni is
quoted to have said, “If we told the ICC that we had found an internal solution, they would be
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section, this argument was predicated, perhaps, on Uganda’s
misunderstanding of the operation of the complementarity principle, under
which the ICC is only empowered to investigate or prosecute international
crimes within its jurisdiction if the relevant national system is not doing so.
However, once the Court’s jurisdiction is triggered, States cannot prosecute
the same case without an order from the ICC.26
III. COMPLEMENTARITY AND ADMISSIBILITY UNDER THE ROME STATUTE
Under the Rome Statute, the cornerstone of the relational architecture
between the ICC and States Parties is the principle of complementarity set
out in the Preamble and stipulated in Article 1.27 Unlike the ad hoc tribunals
for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, which enjoy primary jurisdiction to
try serious international crimes enumerated in their respective statutes,28 the
Rome Statute makes States Parties primarily responsible for trying
perpetrators of crimes that fall within the ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction.29
According to the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber, complementarity is “the
cornerstone of the Statute,” and is the principle that reconciles “the States’
persisting duty to exercise jurisdiction over international crimes with the
establishment of a permanent international criminal court having competence
over the same crimes.”30 Consequently, the ICC only possesses add on, last
resort, or fall back jurisdiction, which is triggered where the admissibility
criteria under the Statute are satisfied. Complementarity operates as a

happy.” Id. The President is further reported to have stated that, if the LRA were to stop
fighting and agree to a “blood settlement,” Uganda would not want the ICC to intervene further.
Id. As discussed below infra text accompanying notes 74–75, the ICC Judges have clearly found
that the Rome Statute does not permit Uganda to withdraw its referral of the LRA case.
26
See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
27
Rome Statute, supra note 3, pmbl., art. 1. The Preamble to the Rome Statute recognizes
“the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for
international crimes” and emphasizes that the ICC “shall be complementary to national
criminal jurisdictions.” Id. pmbl. Article 1 establishes the ICC as a permanent body with
“jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern . . . [which]
shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.” Id. art. 1.
28
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 8, para. 2,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]; Updated Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 1877, art. 9, para. 2,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1877 (July 7, 2009) (amending S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993)).
29
Rome Statute, supra note 3, pmbl., art. 1.
30
Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-377, Decision on the Admissibility of the
Case Under Article 19(1) of the Statute, para. 34 (Mar. 10, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccd
ocs/doc/doc641259.pdf [hereinafter Kony Decision on Admissibility].
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mediating principle to resolve tensions arising from the interplay of domestic
and international criminal jurisdictions under the Rome system of justice.
The issue of admissibility under the ICC regime has been one of
controversy and confusion. Two predominant views stand out in the
literature. First, some scholars suggest that the principal criterion for
determining whether a case is admissible before the ICC is whether the State
is conducting domestic proceedings in the form of either an investigation or
prosecution.31 Second, in what has now become known as the “slogan
version” of complementarity, other scholars argue that a case is admissible
before the ICC only if the primary jurisdiction state is “unwilling” or
“unable” to conduct domestic proceedings.32
Article 17, the governing provision, stipulates negative conditions, i.e.,
circumstances when a case will be inadmissible before the Court.33 It
expressly recalls the principle of complementarity, and then lists four
separate grounds of inadmissibility as follows: (a) the fact that a “case is
being investigated or prosecuted by a State . . . unless the State is unwilling
or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution”; (b) a
State has investigated a case and “decided not to prosecute . . . unless the
decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to
prosecute”; (c) the person has been tried for the same conduct for which a
complaint has been made to the ICC and a subsequent trial will violate the
Statute’s ne bis in idem rule; and (d) “[t]he case is not of sufficient gravity”
to be tried by the ICC.34
31

Darryl Robinson, The Mysterious Mysteriousness of Complementarity, 21 CRIM. L.F. 67,
67 (2010); Danielle E. Goldstone, Comment, Embracing Impasse: Admissibility,
Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Lessons of Uganda for the International Criminal Court, 22
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 761, 785 (2008) (“[C]ontrary to the common articulations of
admissibility, inability or unwillingness is not the test itself, but rather an exception to the
default rule that a case under investigation by a state with jurisdiction is inadmissible.”);
Akhavan, supra note 15, at 414 (“An ordinary interpretation of Articles 17(1)(a) and (b)
indicates that unwillingness or inability is relevant only when a state has investigated or
prosecuted a case; when it has not done so, there is no express requirement of establishing
unwillingness or inability as a precondition for the exercise of jurisdiction.”).
32
Robinson, supra note 31, at 67–68; George H. Norris, Note, Closer to Justice:
Transferring Cases from the International Criminal Court, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 201, 219
(2010); Arsanjani & Reisman, supra note 15, at 386–87; William A. Schabas, Prosecutorial
Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
731, 757 (2008) (arguing that “[t]he two prongs of the complementarity test are well known,
even to non-specialists: the state must be ‘unwilling or unable genuinely’ to investigate or
prosecute”).
33
Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17, para. 1.
34
Id. (emphasis added); see also id. art. 20 (describing the ne bis in idem principle as a
prohibition on being tried twice for the same offense).
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Given the above wording of Article 17, the better view seems to be that a
case is inadmissible before the ICC only when national proceedings, in the
form of an investigation or prosecution, are taking or have taken place. This
view is also shared by the ICC judges, who have held that “the paramount
criterion for determining admissibility of a case is the existence of a genuine
investigation and prosecution at the national level in respect of the case.”35
However, national proceedings do not automatically bar admissibility. By
way of the unwilling or unable exception, the drafters of the Rome Statute
introduced a qualitative criterion, which enables the ICC to assess the
genuineness of the national proceedings.36
The standard of admissibility under the Rome Statute, therefore, consists
of a two-part test.37 The Pre-Trial Chamber first considers whether national
proceedings (in the form of an investigation or prosecution) are taking or
have taken place.38 If the answer to this question is in the negative—in other
words, there are no national proceedings—then there is no bar to
admissibility.39 However, where there are national proceedings, then the
second step’s qualitative assessment becomes relevant in determining an
admissibility challenge.40 In carrying out the latter assessment, the Pre-Trial
Judges will examine whether: (a) the national proceedings are being held to
shield particular individuals from responsibility, (b) there has been inordinate
delay that reveals the intent not to prosecute the person(s) concerned, or (c)
the proceedings lack independence or impartiality.41 Similarly, a State will
be found unable to prosecute where its judicial system has totally or
substantially collapsed; where it fails to arrest the accused; where it fails to
35

Kony Decision on Admissibility, supra note 30, para. 36.
Robinson, supra note 31, at 71 (“[A]lthough much of the literature fixates exclusively on
the ‘unwilling/unable’ test . . . the ‘unwilling/unable’ test is only an exception to the basic
conditions specified in Article 17(1)(a), (b) and (c) . . . .”).
37
Id. at 87.
38
Id. at 85–87 (arguing that the drafting history of Article 17 supports the interpretation
that “national proceedings” must entail an investigation or prosecution).
39
Id. at 87.
40
Id.
41
Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17, para. 2. A good example of (a) and (b) above is
Sudan’s establishment of a Special Criminal Court purportedly to try crimes committed in
Darfur. Sudan announced the establishment of the Court a day after the ICC Prosecutor’s
announcement of his intention to open investigations into the Darfur situation, convincing many
that the real objective of Sudan’s announcement was to oust the ICC’s jurisdiction. See Lack of
Conviction: The Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur, HUM. RTS. WATCH, June 2006,
at 5, 8; Entrenching Impunity: Government Responsibility for International Crimes in Darfur,
HUM. RTS. WATCH, Dec. 2005, at 68–69 (“The timing and speed of the tribunal’s establishment
was another effort to defeat the ICC’s jurisdiction over crimes in Darfur, as some Sudanese
officials even acknowledged.”).
36
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secure evidence; or is not able to get witnesses for the trial.42 In other words,
although the Rome Statute gives primacy to national prosecutions, sham
proceedings at the national level are insufficient to render a case inadmissible
before the ICC.
One could argue that, since Uganda referred the LRA case to the ICC in
the exercise of its sovereign rights, there should be little or no debate about
its cooperation with the ICC or, indeed, the appropriate forum for the LRA
trial. However, as mentioned earlier, political and legal developments in
Uganda since the self-referral have raised various issues, including the
government’s willingness to cooperate with the ICC, whether there is a legal
basis for Uganda to withdraw the self-referral,43 and, most significantly,
given the subsequent advances in peace negotiations and adoption of at least
two agreements on domestic accountability, whether there is reason for the
ICC to defer44 to Ugandan jurisdiction—at least for now.

42
See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17, para. 3 (“In order to determine inability in a
particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or
unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the
necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.”). For
example, in the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision, it noted Uganda’s argument that, for almost
two decades, it “had been unable to secure [the] arrest” of Kony and others allegedly “bearing
the greatest responsibility for the crimes” committed in Northern Uganda and Uganda’s
assertion of this fact as a basis for its support of the LRA trial at the ICC. See Kony Decision
on Admissibility, supra note 30, para. 37. Arsanjani and Reisman argue that “[t]here is no
evidence” that Uganda’s national judicial system had totally or substantially collapsed and,
further, that the government’s inability to arrest “the accused or to conduct investigations in
the north” has nothing to do with the national judicial system. Arsanjani & Reisman, supra
note 15, at 395. However, that the government has been unable to arrest the LRA leaders for
over twenty years is relevant to the admissibility of the case pursuant to the express terms of
the Rome Statute.
43
The Rome Statute provides for the possibility that a State with jurisdiction may challenge
the admissibility of a case. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 19, para. 2. Under Article
19(2)(b), “[a] State which has jurisdiction over a case, [may challenge admissibility] on the
ground that it is investigating or prosecuting the case [or has already done so].” Id. art. 19,
para. 2(b). However, under Article 19(5), such a challenge must be made “at the earliest
opportunity.” Id. para. 5. The Rome Statute, therefore, provides for both ex ante (i.e., before
completion of domestic proceedings) and ex post (i.e., after domestic proceedings) challenges
to admissibility at the ICC. For Uganda, there is no basis for an ex ante challenge because
there are no domestic proceedings regarding the LRA case. See infra Part VII for a discussion
of whether Uganda can bring an admissibility challenge after it conducts domestic
proceedings.
44
See infra notes 157–67 and accompanying text (describing the possibility of deferral).
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IV. LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN UGANDA
A. The Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation and Its Annexure
As noted earlier, despite its referral to the ICC, the Ugandan government
did not give up on the peace process.45 In November 2004, the government
announced a unilateral ceasefire and invited the LRA to negotiate peace.46
However, the talks collapsed the following month.47 Fresh talks opened in
July 2006 and led to the successful negotiation of all agenda items,48 yet the
terms have not resulted in a final peace deal. Given the relative success of
the peace talks, some have suggested that the only seeming obstacles to a
peace deal are the ICC warrants.49 While this suggestion is hard to
substantiate, considering the years of hostilities and the atmosphere of
mutual suspicion between the Parties, the fact remains that the LRA has
conditioned its signature on a withdrawal of the arrest warrants.
The apparent chilling effect of the ICC arrest warrants on the peace
process has prompted calls for the ICC to disengage from Uganda and for the
government to seek alternative accountability options at the national level.50
A wide array of domestic constituencies, including members of Parliament
from Northern Uganda,51 religious and community leaders,52 civil society
45

See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text (describing the peace process and
providing Uganda’s rationale).
46
HEIDI ROSE & IRENE SATTARZADEH, LIU INST. FOR GLOBAL ISSUES, NORTHERN UGANDA:
HUMAN SECURITY UPDATE 5 (2005), available at http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/sites/liu/files/Publicat
ions/HSR-Northern_Uganda.pdf; Apuuli, supra note 2, at 183.
47
ROSE & SATTARZADEH, supra note 46, at 5; Apuuli, supra note 2, at 183.
48
Uganda Begins Ceasefire with LRA, BBC (Aug. 29, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5
293630.stml; see also Apuuli, supra note 4, at 804 (listing the five agenda items agreed upon:
“cessation of hostilities, comprehensive solutions to the conflict, accountability and
reconciliation, formal cease-fire, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration”).
49
Apuuli, supra note 4, at 804–05. Reportedly, Vincent Otti, Deputy Leader of the LRA,
stated:
[T]he rebels [would never] sign any peace deal until the noose around their
necks is loosened by [the] withdrawal of the arrest warrants . . . . [T]he ICC is
the greatest obstacle . . . . Unless the warrants are withdrawn [the rebels] shall
not leave for anywhere. . . . [O]n behalf of the LRA, I want to state that I will
not sign any peace agreement in Juba which sends me to prison. I can only
sign an agreement that brings peace, not one that leads me to the ICC.
Id. (citations omitted).
50
Apuuli, supra note 2, at 184–85.
51
Apuuli, supra note 4, at 805.
52
H. Abigail Moy, Recent Development, The International Criminal Court’s Arrest
Warrants and Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army: Renewing the Debate over Amnesty and
Complementarity, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 267, 270 (2006) (noting, for example, that
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organizations,53 and government officials54 have expressed concern and
opposition to the ICC process. These groups advocate the adoption of a
combination of criminal proceedings and traditional justice approaches at the
national level to deal with the LRA’s war-related crimes.55 It must be
emphasized that these domestic voices do not call for impunity for the LRA;
rather, being mindful of the current impasse over the peace process, they
seek alternative accountability mechanisms that could contribute to the
realization of both peace and justice.
The groundswell of popular opinion for domestic accountability instead
of ICC-based trials for the LRA provides both the context and explanation
for the provisions of the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation
(the Agreement)56 and the Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and
Reconciliation (the Annexure).57 The Agreement expresses commitment to
the principle of complementarity and is premised upon the twin objectives of
accountability and reconciliation through “national legal arrangements.”58 It
calls for both formal justice (criminal trials) and alternative justice
mechanisms,59 especially traditional practices such as Mato Oput, Culo
Kwor, Mato Oput, Kayo Cuk, Ailuc, Tonu ci Koka, and Okukaraba.60 The
Agreement is unclear about the category of perpetrators who will face
formal, as opposed to traditional, justice, but it provides that the formal
“Archbishop Odama of the Gulu Catholic Archdiocese [indicated that] ‘[t]his is like a blow to
the peace process. The process of confidence-building has been moving well, but now the
LRA will look at whoever gets in contact with them as an agent of the ICC.’ ” (citation
omitted)); see also Linda M. Keller, Achieving Peace with Justice: The International Criminal
Court and Ugandan Alternative Justice Mechanisms, 23 CONN. J. INT’L L. 209, 217 (2008)
(noting opposition to ICC involvement by the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative).
53
Apuuli, supra note 2, at 180.
54
Moy, supra note 52, at 270 (noting that Justice Peter Onega, the Chairman of Uganda’s
Amnesty Commission, believes that the ICC warrants may have thwarted reconciliation
efforts by driving away rebels who might have been disposed to accept the terms of the
government amnesty).
55
Keller, supra note 52, at 217–18.
56
Agreement, supra note 6.
57
Annexure, supra note 6.
58
Agreement, supra note 6, pmbl., cl. 2.1.
59
Id. cl. 3.1 (calling for the promotion of “[t]raditional justice mechanisms . . . practiced in
the communities affected by the conflict . . . as a central part of the framework for
accountability and reconciliation”).
60
Id.; Annexure, supra note 6, cl. 21. All of these traditional justice approaches place
emphasis on admission, forgiveness, compensation, and reconciliation, rather than
punishment. See, e.g., Kimberly Hanlon, Comment, Peace or Justice: Now That Peace is
Being Negotiated in Uganda, Will the ICC Still Pursue Justice?, 14 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L.
295, 306 (2007) (“ ‘[M]ato oput’ . . . requires that the perpetrator of the crime admit
wrongdoing to the victim, ask forgiveness, and pay compensation.”).

80

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 40:67

justice mechanisms shall apply to perpetrators of “serious crimes or human
rights violations.”61 It also states that the formal courts shall have
jurisdiction over persons who “bear particular responsibility for the most
serious crimes, especially crimes amounting to international crimes.”62
These provisions may suggest Uganda’s awareness of the need for
perpetrators of serious international crimes, or those holding particular
positions of leadership such that they are presumed to bear the greatest
responsibility for serious violations, to face criminal prosecution rather than
other forms of accountability. However, the Agreement does not state this
explicitly.
Therefore, it remains to be seen how Ugandan prosecutors and judges will
interpret these provisions. One would hope that these requirements are
meant to reflect the international legal standards found in the Statutes of
similar war crimes courts, including the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s
“those bear[ing] the greatest responsibility,”63 or the Cambodia Court’s
“those who [are] most responsible”64 for the perpetration of serious
international crimes. If those interpretations are adopted, it is likely that
because of the positions they held and the influenced they exercised, Joseph
Kony and the LRA leadership would have to face formal criminal
proceedings before the Ugandan courts, rather than traditional justice.
However, the legal situation remains unclear, and Uganda missed the
opportunity to settle the division of labor between the formal and traditional
justice mechanisms when it concluded the 2008 Annexure.65 In fact, the
Annexure seems to introduce further confusion by providing that “serious
crimes” will be tried by “the special Division of the High Court; traditional
justice mechanisms; and any other alternative justice mechanism established
under the [2007] Agreement.”66 Neither the Agreement nor the Annexure
61

Agreement, supra note 6, cl. 4.1.
Id. cl. 6.1.
63
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145. The
Special Court for Sierra Leone is an international criminal court established by an agreement
between the United Nations and the government of Sierra Leone to try perpetrators of serious
international crimes during Sierra Leone’s civil war in the 1990s. For the Special Court’s
constitutive instrument, see Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of
Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178
U.N.T.S. 137.
64
Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for
the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea art. 1
(2002) (amended 2004).
65
Keller, supra note 52, at 219 (noting that the Annexure “raises as many questions as it
answers regarding the exact shape of the alternative justice measures”).
66
Annexure, supra note 6, cl. 23.
62
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defines “serious crimes,” but both consistently refer to formal and traditional
justice processes as ways of securing accountability for the crimes
committed during the conflict.67 This failure to clearly limit accountability
for serious international crimes to formal (criminal), as opposed to traditional
justice mechanisms, is perhaps one of the weakest links in Uganda’s attempt
to construct a national accountability system for the LRA’s crimes. The
Agreement and Annexure, at best remain ambiguous on the question of a
domestic accountability forum for serious crimes allegedly committed by the
LRA.
In 2009, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber considered the effect of the
Agreement and Annexure on the admissibility of the LRA case.68 The ICC
invited observations from the ICC Prosecutor, the defense counsel, Uganda,
and the victims (or their representatives),69 and received amici curiae briefs
on the issue of admissibility.70 In his submissions, the ICC Prosecutor told
the Court that the case remained admissible because there were no national
proceedings in Uganda and noted that the question of admissibility was
determined neither by ongoing peace negotiations nor the adoption of the
Agreement and Annexure.71 Similarly, Uganda submitted that the case was
admissible because the domestic legal processes provided for in the
Agreement and Annexure will only come into force when the LRA signs a
comprehensive peace agreement.72 Since the LRA had not signed any such
peace deal, Uganda held the view that the Agreement and Annexure had “no
legal force.”73

67

Agreement, supra note 6, cl. 4.1 (“Formal criminal and civil justice measures shall be
applied to any individual who is alleged to have committed serious crimes . . . .”); id. cl. 3.1
(referring to “[t]raditional justice mechanisms . . . as a central part of the framework for
accountability and reconciliation”); Annexure, supra note 6, cl. 7 (“A special division of the
High Court of Uganda shall be established to try individuals who are alleged to have
committed serious crimes during the conflict.”); id. cl. 19 (“Traditional justice shall form a
central part of the alternative justice and reconciliation framework identified in the [2007]
Agreement.”).
68
Kony Decision on Admissibility, supra note 30, para. 2.
69
Under the Rome Statute, “where the personal interests of . . . victims are affected,” the
ICC may, at any stage of the proceedings it deems appropriate, hear the views of victims.
Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 68, para. 3. Such views may be presented by the “legal
representatives of the victims,” in a manner that is not prejudicial to, or inconsistent with, the
rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial. Id.
70
Id. paras. 1–2.
71
Id. para. 5.
72
Id. para. 8.
73
Id.
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The Pre-Trial Chamber found that the case was admissible despite the
existence of the Agreement and Annexure.74 In doing so, the Chamber
clarified that pursuant to Article 17 of the Rome Statute, “once the
jurisdiction of the Court is triggered, it is for the [Chamber] and not for any
national judicial authorities . . . to make a binding determination on the
admissibility of a given case.”75 This pronouncement removes all doubt
about Uganda’s perceived power or ability to withdraw its referral. Simply
stated, the above jurisprudence shows that ICC law does not permit such
withdrawals. It was necessary for the Chamber to address and clarify this
issue of Uganda’s ability to withdraw the referral, because Uganda had made
ambiguous submissions regarding the relationship between the ICC and the
Special Division of the High Court of Uganda, which was established under
Article 7 of the Annexure to try persons alleged to have committed “serious
crimes” during the conflict.76 In addition, the Chamber stated, obiter dictum,
that complementarity is the “cornerstone of the [Rome] Statute” and that it is
the principle that reconciles “the States’ persisting duty to exercise
jurisdiction over international crimes with the establishment of [the ICC with
jurisdiction] over the same crimes.”77 It added that “admissibility is the
criterion which enables the determination, in respect of a given case, whether
it is for a national jurisdiction or the [ICC] to proceed.”78 Furthermore, the
Pre-Trial Chamber cited an earlier Pre-Trial decision to the effect that in
order for a case in which national proceedings had commenced to be
inadmissible before the ICC, the “national proceedings must encompass both
the person and the conduct which is the subject of the case before the
[ICC].”79
On the specific question of the admissibility of the LRA case, the PreTrial Chamber noted that at the time of its decision, various institutional and

74

Id. paras. 52–53.
Id. para. 45.
76
Annexure, supra note 6, art. 7. In response to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s request for
responses on the admissibility of the case, Uganda had submitted, inter alia, that the Special
Division of the High Court, “is not meant to supplant the work of the [ICC] and accordingly,
those individuals who were indicted by the [ICC] will have to be brought before the special
division of the High Court for trial.” See Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Case No. ICC-02/0401/05-286-Anx2, Request for Information from the Republic of Uganda on the Status of
Execution of the Warrants of Arrest (Mar. 27, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc4
61285.pdf.
77
Kony Decision on Admissibility, supra note 30, para. 34.
78
Id.
79
Id. para. 17 (citing Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Prosecutor v. Bosco
Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-118, Decision on the Admissibility of the Case, paras. 29–41).
75
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legal developments were taking place in Uganda.80 However, since those
developments could not be qualified as domestic proceedings, they could not
bar admissibility.81 The Pre-Trial Chamber added that the Rome Statute
“does not rule out multiple determinations of admissibility,”82 and, therefore,
it may be possible for Uganda or any of the parties to bring a future
admissibility challenge on the ground that new facts or circumstances,
including domestic proceedings, had arisen in Uganda.83
B. The International Criminal Court Act
In March 2010, the Ugandan Parliament passed the International Criminal
Court Act (ICC Act).84 The ICC Act received presidential assent on May 25,
2010 and entered into force a month later.85 Uganda’s ICC Act provides,
inter alia, for the trial and “punishment of genocide, crimes against humanity
and war crimes”; Uganda’s cooperation with the ICC in the investigation,
arrest, detention, and surrender of persons wanted or convicted by the ICC;
ICC trials to be held in Uganda; and the enforcement of sentences imposed
by the ICC.86 The ICC Act also grants privileges and immunities necessary
for the ICC’s work in Uganda.87
The ICC Act makes the provisions of the Rome Statute applicable to
Ugandan national law.88 It allows Uganda to undertake the legal steps
necessary domestically to implement its Rome Statute obligations regarding
the investigation, and the arrest, transfer, prosecution, and punishment of
persons before the ICC.89 As far as determining a forum choice for the LRA
trial, one consequence of the ICC Act would be to require Uganda to hand
over the LRA leadership to the ICC Prosecutor.90 However, the trial

80

Id. paras. 47–48.
Id. paras. 51–52.
82
Id. para. 25.
83
Id. paras. 25–29.
84
MICHAEL OTIM & MARIEKE WIERDA, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, UGANDA:
IMPACT OF THE ROME STATUTE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 3 (2010), available
at http://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Uganda-Impact-ICC-2010-English.pdf.
85
International Criminal Court Act (2010) (Uganda), available at http://www.ucicc.org/doc
uments/Legal/ICC%20Act%202010.pdf.
86
Id. § 2.
87
Id. § 101.
88
Id. § 2(a).
89
Id. § 20(1)(a); see generally id. pts. III–IV (providing for various forms of cooperation on
the part of the government of Uganda in furtherance of the ICC’s work in the country).
90
Id. § 26.
81
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following such transfer could take place either in Kampala or at The
Hague.91
On the other hand, as discussed above, the Agreement and Annexure
place emphasis on domestic processes of accountability by creating a Special
Division of the High Court of Uganda to try war-related crimes and
traditional justice processes for certain categories of perpetrators.92 The
differences in the two criminal justice regimes, however, become less
significant when one takes a long-term view of criminal accountability for
serious international crimes in Uganda. From that perspective, it is clear that
the ICC Act is lex generalis; its object is to govern relationships, writ large,
between Uganda and the ICC. The Agreement and Annexure, on the other
hand, are lex specialis; they deal with the unique legal and political
challenges posed by the LRA case. In the long run, then, the ICC Act will
likely supplant the regime under the Agreement and Annexure, especially
after the trial of the LRA leadership.
Regarding traditional justice, the various customary mechanisms
recognized by the Agreement and Annexure have formed an important fabric
of local culture and society in Northern Uganda over many generations.
From that perspective, the provisions of the Agreement and Annexure
dealing with traditional justice have an inherently legitimate character as
instruments of dispute settlement, reconciliation, and social harmony at the
local level.93 Whichever way one looks at it, traditional justice must form
part of the panoply of accountability options with which to address the
crimes committed in Uganda. However, given traditional justice’s emphasis
on forgiveness, reconciliation, and compensation, rather than punishment,94
and considering the serious crimes for which the LRA have been accused,
there is perhaps a need to selectively combine traditional justice approaches
with other accountability options, including national trials for senior LRA
leaders, and truth and reconciliation commissions95 for lower-level
91

Id. § 91 (providing for sittings of the ICC to take place in Uganda).
See supra notes 58–59, 66–67 and accompanying text.
93
See Hanlon, supra note 60, at 315–16 (“Traditional justice in Uganda balances ‘the need
to punish individuals for their crimes . . . against the need to restore wholeness to the
community.’ . . . Traditional justice calls for restoring harmony in the community.” (citation
omitted)).
94
See, e.g., id. at 306 (describing the mato oput process).
95
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) are investigative proceedings where
alleged perpetrators of human rights abuses and other violations testify openly about and
admit their crimes, usually in the presence of victims, and ask for forgiveness. In exchange
for their admissions and plea for forgiveness, perpetrators could be granted amnesty from
prosecution, or be ordered to pay or perform other kinds of reparation. Unlike criminal trials
92
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perpetrators. Combining traditional justice with other accountability options,
has the added merit of promoting both accountability and reconciliation as
overarching objectives of the government and people of Uganda.
The first option would be for Uganda to adopt a parallel accountability
process, whereby Kony and other LRA leaders for whom arrest warrants
have been issued by the ICC will be tried at the Special Division of the High
Court for crimes against humanity and war crimes based on internationally
recognized standards.96 If convicted, these LRA leaders must receive prison
terms consistent with the sanctions regime under the Rome Statute.
Alongside these trials, lower-level perpetrators who fall outside of the
leadership category, or whose crimes are not particularly grave, could be
subjected to traditional justice processes. This option has the merit of
preserving the interests of those who advocate for both peace and justice
within Uganda’s domestic judiciary.97
Indeed, the idea of parallel
accountability processes is built into several sections of the Agreement. For
example, the Agreement makes provision for the utilization “of formal and
non formal institutions and measures for ensuring justice and reconciliation
with respect to [crimes committed during] the conflict.”98 Similarly, it calls
for an “overarching justice framework” under which both formal criminal
justice and traditional justice mechanisms would play a role in the processes
of accountability and reconciliation.99
The second option is to hold national trials for the LRA leadership and
subject the lower-level perpetrators, such as former child soldiers, who might
have committed crimes against their own communities or families, to a truth
which are meant to punish perpetrators, the overall objectives of TRCs are to promote peace,
reconciliation and healing in post-conflict societies, and to maintain a historical record of past
wrongdoing. Recent examples in Africa include the TRC established to investigate
Apartheid-era crimes in South Africa, and the TRC established in Sierra Leone after a decadelong civil war in the 1990s. For details on these two TRCs see TRUTH & RECONCILIATION
COMM’N, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT (2003),
available at http://www.info.gov.za; SIERRA LEONE TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N,
WITNESS TO TRUTH (2004), available at http://www.Sierra-Leone.org/TRCDocuments.html.
96
See, e.g., Agreement, supra note 6, cl. 6.1 (providing in relevant part that “individuals
who . . . bear particular responsibility for the most serious crimes, especially crimes
amounting to international crimes” shall be tried before “[f]ormal courts provided for under
the Constitution”).
97
Okello, supra note 12, at 2 (“On the other hand, the rationale for a ‘peace first, justice
later’ position is quite simple: It is a matter of sequencing. And, sequencing should be
distinguished from prioritization. . . . Whichever way you look at it, trying to ensure that the
environment is conducive for a comprehensive pursuit of justice . . . is definitive proof that
you want real justice to be done.”).
98
Agreement, supra note 6, cl. 2.1.
99
Id. cl. 5.2
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and reconciliation commission.100 This approach would be particularly
suitable in a situation like Uganda where the line between perpetrators and
victims is often blurred.101
The third option is for those ostensibly bearing the greatest responsibility
for crimes committed in Northern Uganda, including Kony and his rebel
leadership, to be tried at the ICC.102 Alongside these international trials, a
combination of domestic accountability processes, including national trials at
the Special Division of the High Court, traditional justice, and reconciliation
mechanisms could be put in place and targeted to other alleged perpetrators
depending upon the nature of the allegations against them. This would be
consistent with the ICC Prosecutor’s policy,103 as well as the expectations of
international human rights activists for accountability based on Uganda’s
self-referral in 2003.104 As Human Rights Watch, a nonprofit and
nongovernmental organization, has argued, the search for a durable peace in
100
Id. cl. 12(iv) (stating that “children are not subjected to criminal justice proceedings, but
may participate, as appropriate, in reconciliation processes”). Similarly, clauses 10 and 11 of
the Agreement call for a “gender-sensitive approach,” that the “special needs of women and
girls” are addressed, and that their “dignity, privacy and security” are protected in the
processes of justice and reconciliation envisaged under the Agreement. Id. cls. 10, 11(i),
11(iii).
101
For discussions on the forceful recruitment or abduction of children into the LRA, see
Apuuli, supra note 2, at 183; Ssenyonjo, supra note 2, at 407; Hanlon, supra note 60, at 301.
102
Kony Decision on Admissibility, supra note 30, para. 37 (Mar. 10, 2009) (quoting the
statement by the Solicitor-General of Uganda that the ICC was “ ‘the most appropriate and
effective forum for the investigation and prosecution of those bearing the greatest
responsibility for the crimes [committed in Uganda]’ ” (citation omitted)).
103
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, POLICY PAPER ON THE INTERESTS OF
JUSTICE 7 (2007) [hereinafter POLICY PAPER], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyre
s/772C95C9-F54D-4321-BF09-73422bb23528/143640/ICCOTPInterestsOfJustice.pdf (“The
OTP has clearly stated its policy of focusing its investigations on those bearing the greatest
degree of responsibility. Factors to be taken into account include the alleged status or
hierarchical level of the accused or implication in particularly serious or notorious crimes.
That is, the significance of the role of the accused in the overall commission of crimes and the
degree of the accused’s involvement (actual commission, ordering, indirect participation).”);
see also Uganda: Interview with ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo, INTEGRATED REG’L
INFO. NETWORKS (June 9, 2005), http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=54856 (noting
the Prosecutor’s acknowledgment that investigation and prosecutions will focus on those
limited number of individuals who bear the greatest responsibility for committing the most
serious crimes within the jurisdiction of the court).
104
See Elise Keppler & Richard Dicker, Trading Justice for Peace in Uganda Won’t Work,
UGANDA DAILY MONITOR (May 3, 2007), http://www.hrw.org/news/2007/05/02/trading-justic
e-peace-uganda-won-t-work (“[T]o achieve . . . peace, the warring parties and the mediators
cannot bargain away prosecution of the LRA leaders who have been charged with grave
crimes. Simply put, a solution that avoids meaningful justice will undercut the prospects for a
durable peace.”).
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Uganda must entail “both a peace agreement and fair, credible prosecutions
of those responsible for the most serious crimes committed . . . during the
conflict.”105
Given the context of ongoing conflict in the country, the differing views
of advocates of peace versus advocates of justice, the tensions between
traditional and Western forms of justice and between domestic and
international systems, as well as the need to consider alternative forms of
accountability like truth commissions for certain categories of perpetrators,
Uganda cannot afford to shut out any of the accountability options. Arriving
at the right balance with respect to these options would be a complex, timeconsuming exercise. In order to succeed, Uganda and the ICC must align
their priorities and recognize that neither the international call for justice
against the LRA nor the domestic need for a peaceful settlement of the
conflict, can be easily shrugged off as irrelevant or insignificant.
V. THE CASE FOR UGANDA-BASED TRIALS
In light of the current impasse over the final peace agreement and the
position of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber that the LRA case remains admissible
before the ICC, are there good reasons to suggest that Uganda-based trials
hold the best promise for achieving both peace and justice? The inability
thus far of the parties to reach a final peace settlement means that warravaged Ugandans continue to face an unsettling political situation.
Similarly, the theoretical existence of various accountability options, when
viewed in light of Uganda’s inability to arrest Kony, implies that the ICC
warrants have become the proverbial “Sword of Damocles” hanging not only
over the head of the LRA, but also over the entire peace process.
Unfortunately, the victim population of Northern Uganda who helplessly
continue to suffer the effects of over two decades of inexplicable violence is
trapped between a group of brutal rebels and the political elite. This is
particularly true of the Acholi ethnic group, whose sentiments remain
understandably divided over the issue.106 It is Acholi children who, in the
main, have been forcibly abducted and turned into child soldiers by the
LRA.107 Therefore, while many Acholi would like to see some form of
105

House of Commons Select Committee on International Development Inquiry “Prospects for
Sustainable Peace in Uganda,” HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 17, 2007), http://www.hrw.org/news/2
007/07/16/house-commons-select-committee-international-development-inquiry-prospects-sustai
nab [hereinafter House of Commons].
106
Keller, supra note 52, at 225.
107
Ssenyonjo, supra note 2, at 411–12.
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accountability for Kony and his henchmen, they would also want to see a
peaceful resolution of the conflict so that their sons and daughters can return
home.108 This is just one illustration of the complex interplay of interests and
factors that require careful consideration in dealing with the LRA case.
There is a strong body of public opinion in Uganda that supports dropping
the ICC warrants and the use of alternative accountability mechanisms for
the LRA’s crimes.109 In other words, Ugandans are not advocating impunity
for the rebel leadership; however, as the people most directly affected by the
conflict, they prefer that the quest for justice be appropriately timed and
carried out in a manner that does not defeat the prospects for peace.110 It has
been reported that the majority of Members of Parliament from Northern
Uganda hold the view that the ICC warrants should be dropped in favor of
traditional justice mechanisms.111 Similarly, leading figures such as former
Minister in Museveni’s government and longtime peace negotiator Betty
Bigombe,112 the head of the Uganda Amnesty Commission,113 and religious
leaders from Northern Uganda, including the Acholi Religious Leaders
Peace Initiative,114 have all expressed concern that the arrest warrants could
adversely affect chances of a negotiated settlement and dissuade the rebels
from responding to a final peace initiative. Moreover, traditional Acholi
leaders, from whose community the LRA draws most of its members, but
who also constitute the largest population of victims of the LRA’s crimes,115
have made no secret of their preference for traditional justice and
reconciliation over the ICC process.116 Rwot Onen David Acana II,
Paramount Chief of the Acholi, stated “ ‘The best way to resolve the . . . war
in our region is through poro lok ki mato oput (peace talks and
reconciliation) as it’s in the Acholi culture . . . . [T]he Acholi do not buy their
idea of taking [Kony] to court.’ ”117 During his visit to Northern Uganda in
108

Keller, supra note 52, at 224.
See, e.g., Apuuli, supra note 2, at 184–85 (citing religious leaders, members of the
Amnesty Commission, and local politicians as having expressed disapproval of the ICC’s
involvement in Uganda).
110
See Okello, supra note 12, at 2 (calling for appropriate sequencing of peace and justice).
111
Apuuli, supra note 4, at 805.
112
Apuuli, supra note 2, at 185 (noting remarks by Bigombe that as a result of rushed nature
of the ICC warrants “there is now no hope of getting the LRA commanders to surrender”
(citation omitted)).
113
Moy, supra note 52, at 270.
114
Keller, supra note 52, at 217.
115
Ssenyonjo, supra note 2, at 411–12.
116
Goldstone, supra note 31, at 774.
117
Id. (citation omitted). Scholar Alex Little explains consequences of favoring accountability
over victim autonomy:
109
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2006, then United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian
Affairs, Jan Egeland, noted that most stakeholders in the Ugandan peace
process felt that the ICC warrants “ ‘should be dropped against the LRA
leaders so that a peaceful conclusion to the talks can be reached.’ ”118
In addition, there are compelling criminal justice arguments in favor of
national trials. It is uncontroverted that most of the LRA’s crimes were
committed in Uganda, the victims and perpetrators are Ugandan, and almost
all of the potential witnesses and forensic evidence are to be found in
Uganda. Both from the point of view of traditional international law119 and
the complementarity regime of the Rome Statute,120 Uganda’s jurisdiction to
try the LRA is unquestionable.
Moreover, investigations and trial
management would be less cumbersome, more cost effective, and hopefully
speedier if the trials were held in Uganda.
There are also inherent legitimacy gains in having Ugandan perpetrators
of serious crimes face justice at the hands of fellow Ugandans, as well as in
the presence of victims and families.121 Ugandan investigators, prosecutors,
First, when victims oppose prosecution, their safety and that of the
community might not be improved by a blanket policy that favors
prosecution. . . . Second, prosecutors send mixed messages when they
proceed with prosecution against victims’ wishes. The constructive signal of
accountability often is paired with destructive portrayals of uncooperative
victims as weak, irrational, or helpless.
Alex Little, Balancing Accountability and Victim Autonomy at the International Criminal
Court, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 363, 363–64 (2007). Little concludes that “although prosecution
can impose significant costs on individual victims and victimized communities, this risk may
be necessary to ensure that grave crimes never again are committed with impunity.” Id. at
354. Clearly, Little favors aggressive prosecution on the basis of its deterrent potential.
Unfortunately, as experience has shown, it is hard to prove empirically that aggressive
prosecution always leads to deterrence. In the context of Uganda, the question is not so much
whether to prosecute Kony and the LRA leaders, as much as where such prosecution should
take place—within traditional society, in national courts, or at the ICC.
118
Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative Justice,
and the International Criminal Court, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 107, 116 (2009) (citation omitted).
Further, the Catholic archdiocese’s Justice and Peace Commission of Gulu stated that “ ‘[t]o
start war crimes investigations for the sake of justice at a time when the war is not yet over,
risks having, in the end, neither justice nor peace delivered.’ ” Arsanjani & Reisman, supra
note 15, at 385 (citation omitted).
119
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 300–07 (7th ed. 2008)
(discussing the traditional bases for criminal jurisdiction recognized under international law).
120
Rome Statute, supra note 3, pmbl., art. 1.
121
See U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and
Post-Conflict Societies: Rep. of the Secretary-General, para. 34, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug.
23, 2004) (“While the international community is obliged to act directly for the protection of
human rights and human security where conflict has eroded or frustrated the domestic rule of
law, in the long term, no ad hoc, temporary or external measures can ever replace a
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and judges must be presumed to have a better understanding of the historical
and political context of the conflict.122 The ability of victims and families to
bear witness to, and participate in, proceedings against those who have so
egregiously violated their most basic human rights could facilitate a better
understanding of the justice process by victims and survivors and lead to
their acceptance of the proceedings. As seen in other conflict situations,
victims of large-scale atrocities such as those in Uganda, generally favor the
idea that, given the scale and degree of the crimes committed against them,
some form of justice, albeit an imperfect one, is preferable to no justice at
all.123
From the point of view of deterrence, it has been argued that national
trials for perpetrators of serious international crimes contribute more
effectively to preventing the recurrence of similar crimes in the future. For
example, in the context of Rwanda and Yugoslavia, at least one commentator
has argued that the establishment and experience of the mixed international
tribunals in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Kosovo show “that justice
delivered close to the affected societies in Rwanda or Former Yugoslavia is
far more effective than in the remote confines of Arusha or The Hague.”124
Ideally, successful trials of the LRA in Uganda would not only contribute to
deterrence, but also enhance prospects for national reconciliation upon which
a sustainable peace can be built.125 Finally, one cannot overstate the positive

functioning national justice system.”).
122
See, e.g., id. para. 16 (“Local consultation enables a better understanding of the dynamics
of past conflict, patterns of discrimination and types of victims.”).
123
In the context of the ICTY, for example, Diane Orentlicher has found that, while many
victims and survivors were not totally satisfied by the cost, speed, indictments issued, or
sentences imposed by the ICTY, they also accept the idea that the justice administered by the
ICTY, imperfect as it may be, is better than no justice at all. See DIANE F. ORENTLICHER,
INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, THAT SOMEONE GUILTY BE PUNISHED: THE IMPACT OF
THE ICTY IN BOSNIA 14 (2010).
124
Jean-Marie Kamatali, From the ICTR to ICC: Learning from the ICTR Experience in
Bringing Justice to Rwandans, 12 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 89, 91 (2005).
125
House of Commons, supra note 105 (“Prosecutions send the message . . . to would-be
perpetrators, that no one is above the law. This can help consolidate respect for the rule of
law and contribute to deterring future abuses, thereby helping to cement peace and stability.”);
see also Kamatali, supra note 124, at 91–92. Kamatali, former Dean of Law at the National
University of Rwanda, argues,
For the Rwandan community, on the sides of both the victim and the
perpetrator, the justice and deterrence expected from the ICTR results not
only from knowing that Akayesu, Kambanda or Bagosora . . . have been
condemned. More importantly, it also results from witnessing the process
through which they lost their positions of power, authority and harm.
Id. at 92.

2011]

UNLOCKING THE MYSTERIOUSNESS OF COMPLEMENTARITY

91

effects of such trials on the rule of law in Uganda, as well as on the potential
for capacity building of Uganda’s legal institutions to deal with serious
international crimes.
In order for Uganda to successfully undertake these prosecutions and
stand any chance of meeting the inadmissibility requirements of the Rome
Statute, it must first strengthen its national legal framework for the trial of
serious international crimes. In its endeavor “to map out the contours of
acceptable domestic proceedings,”126 Uganda can learn useful lessons from
the experience of the ICTR regarding the prosecutor’s application to transfer
cases for trial in Rwandan courts. These lessons are relevant because the
ICTR, like other international justice institutions established to deal with
grave atrocities, sets not only global, but also national standards of justice.
In the words of one commentator, such institutions define “what domestic
criminal justice should look like for adjudicating crimes against humanity,
genocide, and war crimes.”127
VI. LESSONS FROM THE ICTR EXPERIENCE
The ICTR Prosecutor’s applications to refer cases to Rwanda for trial and
Uganda’s desire to try the LRA case in its national courts, both concern the
application of the general principle of concurrent jurisdiction between
national and international courts, although there are important legal and
factual differences that must be taken into account.
First, as stated earlier, while the ICTR enjoys primacy over Rwanda
regarding the trial of cases falling within the ICTR’s jurisdiction, the ICC’s
jurisdiction only kicks in as a last resort when the inadmissibility conditions
under Article 17 of the Rome Statute are satisfied.128 In addition to the
statutory distinction between primacy and complementarity,129 a second
distinction is the fact that at the time of ruling on the Prosecutor’s referral
126
William W. Burke-White & Scott Kaplan, Shaping the Contours of Domestic Justice:
The International Criminal Court and an Admissibility Challenge in the Uganda Situation, 7
J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 257, 278 (2009).
127
Blumenson, supra note 9, at 805.
128
Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 17.
129
Under the Statute of the ICTR, the U.N Security Council has conferred on that Court the
primary responsibility to investigate and prosecute genocide, war crimes and crimes against
humanity falling within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. For this reason, the Tribunal can ask
national courts to defer to its jurisdiction. ICTR Statute, supra note 28, art. 8, paras. 1–2. On
the other hand, the principle of complementarity under the Rome Statute, implies that the
primary responsibility for investigating and prosecuting crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction,
lies with States and the ICC can only take action where the national jurisdiction fails to
investigate or prosecute. Rome Statute, supra note 3, pmbl., art. 1.
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requests, the ICTR had most of the indictees in its custody.130 It was,
therefore, easier for the ICTR Judges to impose conditions on their transfer
to national jurisdiction.131 This situation stands in stark contrast to Uganda’s
twenty-year inability to arrest the LRA leadership.132 While Uganda seems
to want to sequence peace over justice, the ICC insists on implementing its
statutory mandate of bringing to justice those allegedly bearing responsibility
for serious international crimes. This provides a third important distinction
with the Rwanda situation, where the war ended in 1994 and by the time the
ICTR judges ruled on the Prosecutor’s referral requests, both the national
and international systems were singularly focused on bringing the
perpetrators to justice.133
Despite these differences, however, the normative architecture that the
ICTR judges established for the trial of serious international crimes at the
domestic level could provide useful lessons for Uganda’s emerging criminal
justice system vis-à-vis the LRA trials. After all, like Rwanda, Uganda is
another African country grappling with the effects of large-scale violence
130
President of the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Letter dated Dec. 8, 2006 from the
President of the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda addressed to the President of the U.N.
Sec. Council, paras. 3–5, U.N. Doc. S/2006/951 (Dec. 8, 2006) (informing the Security
Council that, at the date of his report, trials involving 58 persons had either been completed or
were in progress; 11 detainees were awaiting trial; and 18 indictees were at large).
131
See Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-2005-86-R11bis, Decision on the
Prosecution Motion for Referral to the Kingdom of Norway, para. 5 (May 19, 2006), http://ictrarchive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLISH/cases/Bagaragaza/decisions/190506.html [hereinafter
Bagaragaza Trial Chamber Decision] (noting that the considerations for ruling on a motion for
referral include “the jurisdiction, willingness and preparedness of the Referral State” and “the
ability of the Referral State to conduct a fair trial”).
132
The government of Uganda’s inability to arrest the LRA leadership or bring the war to an
end is a well-known fact. Due to this inability, in October 2011, U.S. President Barack
Obama authorized the deployment of about one hundred special force soldiers to help
Ugandan and African Union troops track down Kony. The U.S. forces will not engage in
combat, but will rather serve in an advisory and support role. See ALEXIS ARIEFF & LAUREN
PLOCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42094, THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY: THE UNITED STATES
RESPONSE (2011).
133
ICTR Statute, supra note 28, art. 8, para. 1. The Resolution notes, inter alia, that serious
crimes, including genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, had been committed in
Rwanda and that this “constitute[s] a threat to international peace and security.” Id. pmbl.
Although Rwanda initially called for and supported the establishment of the ICTR to
prosecute those allegedly responsible for the commission of these crimes, as a non-permanent
member of the U.N. Security Council in 1994, the country ended up voting against the U.N.’s
resolution due to disagreements over the seat of the ICTR and the non-applicability of the
death penalty. See, e.g., Parker Patterson, Comment, Partial Justice: Successes and Failures
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Ending Impunity for Violations of
International Criminal Law, 19 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 369, 372 (2010) (noting Rwanda’s
“objections regarding the structure, jurisdiction, and location of the tribunal”).
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within its borders. But, while neighboring Rwanda’s attempt to ensure
accountability for genocide and other serious violations of international law
took place in a post-conflict setting, Uganda faces an ongoing conflict, and,
given the equally important goal of securing a lasting peace in the country,
the accountability process remains delicate. Yet, the internal nature of both
conflicts, the quest for domestic rather than international accountability for
grave crimes, debates about the maturity of their respective criminal justice
systems to deal with wide-scale atrocities, and perceptions about victors’
justice in both contexts, mean that Uganda can learn useful lessons from the
Rwandan experience.
The cornerstone of the normative architecture for referral of cases from
the ICTR to national jurisdiction is contained in Rule 11 bis of the ICTR
Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the various decisions of the Trial and
Appeals Chamber (Appeals Chamber) that interpret it.134 As there is no
question about Uganda’s primary jurisdiction to try the LRA—save for the
self-referral—this section focuses on the standards which the ICTR judges
have, in their interpretation of Rule 11 bis, set for national proceedings to
satisfy international legal standards.
A. Trials Must Be for International, Not Ordinary, Crimes
In dealing with the Prosecutor’s first-ever Rule 11 bis request for referral
to national jurisdiction in Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, the ICTR Appeal
Chamber held that the conduct for which the accused is charged, must
constitute an international crime under the law of the referral state.135
According to the Appeals Chamber, the ICTR’s statutory authority permits
referral only for prosecution as serious violations of international
humanitarian law, not for prosecution as ordinary crimes.136 Thus, the
Appeals Chamber held, confirming the decision of the Trial Chamber, that
Bagaragaza’s case could not be referred to Norway.137 The Appeals
134
Rule 11 bis provides that a referral can only be made to “a State: (i) in whose territory the
crime was committed; or (ii) in which the accused was arrested; or (iii) [which has]
jurisdiction and [is] willing and adequately prepared to accept such a case.” Int’l Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. ITR/3.REV.1, r. 11bis(A)
(June 29, 1995) (as amended Feb. 9, 2010), http://unictr.org/Portals/0/English/Legal/ROP/100
209.pdf. In determining a request for referral, the Trial Chamber is required to consider
whether “the accused will receive a fair trial . . . and that the death penalty will not be imposed
or carried out.” Id. r. 11bis(C).
135
Bagaragaza Trial Chamber Decision, supra note 131, para. 16.
136
Id.
137
Id.
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Chamber reasoned that, unlike in the ICTR where Bagaragaza would have
been tried for genocide, the Norwegian penal code only permitted his trial for
the ordinary crime of homicide.138
If the trials in Uganda are to meet international legal standards, including
the inadmissibility requirements of the Rome Statute, the LRA leaders must
be tried for serious international crimes, including crimes against humanity
and war crimes as contained in the ICC warrants. In this regard, it is
important to note that Uganda’s recently passed ICC Act provides for the
prosecution of serious international crimes.139 However, in moving forward,
Uganda must not only clarify the ambiguous term “serious crimes” under the
Agreement and Annexure, but must reconcile that notion with the ICC Act
which specifically provides for the trial of genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity.
B. Uganda Must Conduct Fair Trials
The ICTR jurisprudence under Rule 11 bis also provides useful guidance
on relevant fair trial standards that must be adhered to when serious
international crimes are prosecuted at the domestic level.140 In addition to
independent and impartial judges, the domestic legal framework must afford
equality of arms to the prosecution and defense. The legal system must
protect the rights of the accused during trial, including the right to call
witnesses to testify in his or her defense, to secure the assistance of counsel
(if necessary, at the expense of the State), and not to be compelled to testify
against himself or herself or to confess guilt.141

138
Id. paras. 14–15, 17. But see Prosecutor v. Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55B-R11bis,
Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal Against Decision on Referral under Rule 11bis, para. 12
(Dec. 4, 2008), http://ictr-archive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLISH/cases/Hategekimana/decision
s/081204.pdf [hereinafter Hategekimana Appellate Chamber Decision] (holding that this
requirement is limited to the substantive offence charged, and not a mode of liability).
139
International Criminal Court Act, supra note 85, § 2 (“The purpose of this act is . . . (c) to
make further provision in Uganda’s law for the punishment of the international crimes of
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.”).
140
See Uganda: Any Alternative to the ICC Should Meet Key Benchmarks, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (May 31, 2007), http://www.hrw.org/news/2007/05/30/Uganda-any-alternative-icc-sh
ould-meet-key-benchmarks (arguing that national alternatives to the ICC must entail
“credible, independent and impartial investigation and prosecution; rigorous adherence in
principle and practice to international fair trial standards; and penalties that are appropriate
and reflect the gravity of the crimes”).
141
See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 67 (detailing the rights of the accused under the
Rome Statute); ICTR Statute, supra note 28, art. 20 (detailing the rights of the accused under
the ICTR Statute).
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In this context, the jurisprudence of the ICTR holds that the accused must
be able “to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her
behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him or her.”142
Further, the ICTR holds that trials in Rwanda would be unfair where
witnesses living in that country were found to be unwilling to testify for the
defense due to fear that they may face serious consequences, including
threats, harassment, torture, arrest, or being killed.143 Similarly, the ICTR
case law holds that Rwanda-based trials would be unfair in circumstances
where the majority of defense witnesses live outside the country and would
be afraid to testify in Rwanda.144
Although Rwanda and the ICTR Prosecutor both argued that the domestic
legal framework provided alternative facilities, such as video-link
technology, for the testimony of witnesses who are either unwilling or unable
to travel to Rwanda, the judges were unconvinced that the existence of such
facilities would provide a sufficient remedy.145 The judges recalled their
experience with cases tried at the ICTR, where a large majority of defense
142
ICTR Statute, supra note 28, art. 20, para. 4(e); Hategekimana Appellate Chamber
Decision, supra note 138, para. 26; Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-2002-78-R11bis,
Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11bis, para. 31
(Oct. 30, 2008), http://unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CKanyarukiga%5Cdicisions%
5C081030.pdf [hereinafter Kanyarukiga Appellate Chamber Decision]; Prosecutor v.
Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal Against
Decision on Referral Under Rule 11bis, para. 40 (Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/
Case/English/Munyakazi/decisions/081008.pdf [hereinafter Munyakazi Appellate Chamber
Decision].
143
Hategekimana Appellate Chamber Decision, supra note 138, para. 22; Munyakazi
Appellate Chamber Decision, supra note 142, para. 45; Kanyarukiga Appellate Chamber
Decision, supra note 142, para. 34; Prosecutor v. Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61-R11bis,
Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, para. 72 (Nov. 17,
2008), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Gatete/decisions/081117.pdf [hereinafter
Gatete Trial Chamber Decision].
144
Gatete Trial Chamber Decision, supra note 143, paras. 65–72; Prosecutor v.
Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-2002-78-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral
to the Republic of Rwanda, paras. 76–77 (June 6, 2008), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/
English/Kanyarukiga/decisions/080606.pdf [hereinafter Kanyarukiga Trial Chamber
Decision]; Prosecutor v. Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR-0055B-R11bis, Decision on
Prosecutor’s Request for the Referral of the Case of Ildephonse Hategekimana to Rwanda,
para. 71 (June 19, 2008), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Hategekimana/decisio
ns/080619.pdf [hereinafter Hategekimana Trial Chamber Decision]; Prosecutor v. Munyakazi,
Case No. ICTR-97-36-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of Case to the
Republic of Rwanda, paras. 63–66 (May 28, 2008), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/Eng
lish/Munyakazi/decisions/080528.pdf [hereinafter Munyakazi Trial Chamber Decision].
145
Hategekimana Trial Chamber Decision, supra note 144, paras. 70–71; Kanyarukiga Trial
Chamber Decision, supra note 144, paras. 78–79; Munyakazi Trial Chamber Decision, supra
note 144, paras. 65–66.
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witnesses travelled to testify in Arusha from places outside Rwanda, and
ruled that the utilization of video-link technology could result in a situation
where the majority of prosecution witnesses are heard directly by the
Chamber, while most defense evidence is only heard indirectly, through
video-link testimony.146 The judges held that this imbalance would violate
the principle of equality of arms and render the trial unfair since the rights of
the accused to obtain the attendance of witnesses and to examine witnesses
under the same conditions as witnesses for the prosecution would be
violated.147
In addition, it is important that defense teams be able to work in a
conducive environment that enables them to carry out investigations, access
documents, and secure witnesses for trial.148 In the Kanyarukiga case, the
ICTR Appeals Chamber held that difficulties experienced by defense counsel
in obtaining documents and meeting potential witnesses, especially detainees
in Rwanda, showed that “working conditions for the Defence may be
difficult” and this could affect the fair trial rights of the accused.149
Uganda must also establish an independent and impartial witness
protection program, which is accessible by both parties. In this respect, the
ICTR case law holds that where a witness protection service was located in
the office of Rwanda’s Prosecutor General and complaints of witness
harassment must be reported to the police, potential defense witnesses may
be afraid to avail themselves of its services, thereby undermining the
prospects of a fair trial.150
C. There Must Be an Adequate Penalty Structure
The ICTR case law also lays down that ambiguity regarding the penalty
structure governing serious international crimes, may render a domestic legal
framework inadequate to try such offenses. In the Bagaragaza case, one of
the reasons implicit in the Trial Chamber’s denial of the Prosecutor’s referral
request to Norway was that Bagaragaza would only face a maximum term of
twenty-one years imprisonment if tried as an accessory to homicide or for
146
Hategekimana Appellate Chamber Decision, supra note 138, para. 26; Gatete Trial
Chamber Decision, supra note 143, paras. 70–72; Kanyarukiga Appellate Chamber Decision,
supra note 142, para. 33; Munyakazi Appellate Chamber Decision, supra note 142, para. 42.
147
Hategekimana Appellate Chamber Decision, supra note 138, para. 26; Gatete Trial
Chamber Decision, supra note 143, para. 72; Kanyarukiga Appellate Chamber Decision,
supra note 142, para. 34; Munyakazi Appellate Chamber Decision, supra note 142, para. 43.
148
Kanyarukiga Appellate Chamber Decision, supra note 142, para. 21.
149
Id. paras. 19, 21.
150
Id. paras. 26–27.
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negligent homicide under Norwegian law, rather than life imprisonment
following a genocide trial at the ICTR.151 Similarly, in the Munyakazi and
Kanyarukiga cases, the Trial and Appeals Chambers both held that ambiguity
regarding which one (of two) penalty regimes in Rwandan law would govern
cases transferred under Rule 11 bis raised the possibility that life
imprisonment in isolation could be imposed.152 The judges held that,
because there was no evidence that the minimum safeguards against such an
exceptional penalty were available under Rwandan law, they could not order
referral to Rwandan courts.153 Indeed, this issue was of such fundamental
concern to the judges that, although Rwanda had passed legislation excluding
life imprisonment in solitary confinement from cases referred from the
ICTR, the judges still denied the Prosecutor’s subsequent request to refer
Hategekimana’s case on the ground that the amendment had not yet entered
into force at the time of the Appeal Chamber’s Decision.154
The relevance of this holding to the situation in Uganda is self-evident. If
Uganda applies the provisions of the Agreement calling for a “regime of
alternative penalties and sanctions”155 and proceeds, after trial, to place the
LRA leaders under sanctions such as house arrest, apologies, or requires
them merely to pay compensation under a traditional justice process, it is
unlikely that the domestic trials will meet international standards or, indeed,
the inadmissibility tests under the Rome Statute.156
151

Bagaragaza Trial Chamber Decision, supra note 131, para. 9.
Munyakazi Appellate Chamber Decision, supra note 142, paras. 19–21; Kanyarukiga
Appellate Chamber Decision, supra note 142, paras. 16–17. The ambiguity arose out of
whether the punishment regime to be applied to referral cases was the one under a Rwandan
law providing for a maximum sentence of life imprisonment (Transfer Law), or the Rwandan
law providing for the possibility of life imprisonment with special provisions (i.e., solitary
confinement) for certain categories of offenders, including those convicted of genocide
(Abolition of Death Penalty Law). Munyakazi Appellate Chamber Decision, supra note 142,
paras. 9–10. The Appeals Chamber held that there were at least three alternative
interpretations of the sanctions regime under Rwandan law including that: (1) since the
Abolition of Death Penalty law post-dated the Transfer Law, it was lex posterior and should
therefore be applicable; (2) the Transfer Law was lex specialis and its provisions cannot be
displaced by a general law; and (3) there was in fact no inconsistency between the laws and
that the Abolition of Death Penalty Law merely elaborated the sentencing structure under the
Transfer Law. Id. paras. 16−17. The Appeals Chamber held that it fell within the jurisdiction
of the Rwandan courts to determine which of these regimes applied but that the legal
ambiguity was sufficient to deny the referral request. Id. paras. 19–21.
153
Munyakazi Appellate Chamber Decision, supra note 142, paras. 18, 20.
154
Hategekimana Appellate Chamber Decision, supra note 138, paras. 37–38.
155
Agreement, supra note 6, cl. 6.3.
156
Burke-White & Kaplan, supra note 126, at 273; see also House of Commons, supra note
105 (arguing that imprisonment should be the primary penalty for the most serious crimes
152
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VII. PROCEDURAL OPTIONS OPEN TO UGANDA
The Rome Statute contains several provisions that could be invoked in
support of domestic trials of the LRA. First, Uganda can, on the basis of
Article 16 of the Rome Statute, request the United Nations Security Council
to adopt a Chapter VII resolution deferring the ICC investigation or
prosecution for a renewable period of one year.157 However, as discussed
below, the Security Council’s “power of ‘negative’ intervention”158 in the
work of the ICC, while possible on paper, is a difficult one in practice. First,
in order to convince the Security Council to grant the deferral, Uganda must
demonstrate that deferment of the ICC’s work would be in the interests of
international peace and security under Article 39 of the United Nations
Charter159 and not just in the interest of domestic peace in the country. In
other words, at a prima facie level, the Security Council would have to
determine that proceeding with the international prosecution would
constitute a threat to international peace and security before it can order
deferral.
Secondly, even if it were possible for one to convincingly argue that the
request would meet the legal threshold to trigger Security Council deferral,
Uganda must be able to successfully canvass and convince at least nine of
the fifteen members of the Security Council including all of the permanent
five.160 Given the difficult political dynamics and the existing divisions in
the Security Council regarding the role of the ICC, it is unlikely that Uganda
would be able to muster sufficient political will on the part of Security
Council members for them to flex their Article 16 muscle.
Moreover, if the track record of the Security Council on Article 16
matters is anything to go by, then it is highly unlikely that Uganda will
succeed even where it chooses to explore this option. In 2009, the African
Union itself, the continental body that represents all of Africa’s fifty-three

committed during the Ugandan conflict and that the penalty structure under the Rome Statute,
as well as the jurisprudence of the ICTR and ICTY, support the imposition of lengthy terms of
imprisonment following convictions for serious international crimes including genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity).
157
Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 16.
158
DAPO AKANDE ET AL., INST. FOR SEC. STUDIES, AN AFRICAN EXPERT STUDY ON THE
AFRICAN UNION CONCERNS ABOUT ARTICLE 16 OF THE ROME STATUTE OF THE ICC 7 (2010).
159
U.N. Charter art. 39 (“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore international peace and
security.”).
160
Id. art. 27, para. 3.
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member states of the United Nations,161 invited the Security Council to
invoke Article 16 powers so as to defer the ICC investigation against
President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir of Sudan, the sitting Sudanese Head of
State.162 In making that request, the African Union reasoned that the ICC
investigation and possible issuance of an arrest warrant against President
Bashir could derail the Union’s peace initiatives in Darfur.163 Indeed, it was
the African Union’s position that, while it supported accountability for
serious crimes committed in Darfur, this process should be properly
sequenced so that the continent’s efforts to secure a political settlement are
not undermined.164 Unfortunately, the Security Council did not act on the
African Union proposal, leading to strained relations not only between the
Union and Security Council, but also between the Union and the ICC.165
Relations reached their lowest point when the African Union Assembly of
Heads of State adopted a Declaration in Sirte, Libya in 2009, calling on its
members not to cooperate with the ICC investigation on the Bashir
dossier.166
Given this experience, it is unlikely that Uganda can succeed on an
Article 16 request where the whole of the African Union has failed. While
deferment of the LRA case by the Security Council remains a theoretical
possibility, in practice it is fraught with difficulty, including the fact that,
even if successful, such a deferral would only last for one year at a time, and
the drafting history of the Rome Statute does not permit the use of Article 16
as a political weapon to block prosecutions on a permanent basis.167

161
AU in a Nutshell, AFRICAN UNION, http://www.au.int/en/about/nutshell (last visited Nov.
18, 2011).
162
Assembly of the African Union, Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), para. 8(ii), Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XIII)
(July 1–3, 2009), available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Conferences/2009/july/summ
it/decisions/ASSEMBLY%20AU%20DEC%20243%20-%20267%20(XIII)%20_e.pdf; African
Union, Communiqué of the 207th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, para. 5, Doc.
PSC/AHG/COMM.1(CCVII) (Oct. 29, 2009), available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/ar/
index/Communiqu%20on%20Darfur%20_eng..pdf.
163
AKANDE ET AL., supra note 158, at 10–11.
164
Id. at 11 (“The [African Union was] concern[ed] that regional efforts for long-term peace
on the continent should not be undermined by the ICC’s interest in short-term
prosecutions . . . .”).
165
Id. at 5.
166
Assembly of the African Union, supra note 162, para. 10.
167
Uganda: Any Alternative to the ICC Should Meet Key Benchmarks, supra note 140
(arguing that in the absence of credible national prosecutions, the Article 16 deferral could,
where renewed, be utilized to shield the LRA leadership from facing trial and set a dangerous
precedent of political interference in the ICC’s judicial work).

100

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 40:67

The second alternative open to Uganda would be to raise an admissibility
challenge before the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber. As it currently stands, the
admissibility of the LRA case can be discussed on the basis of two
provisions of Article 17 of the Rome Statute that are directly relevant. First,
Article 17(1)(a) raises the possibility of an ex ante admissibility challenge,
i.e., during the course of domestic investigations or prosecutions.168 An ex
ante admissibility challenge would invoke the complementarity principle on
the front end and, thereby, forestall the ICC from carrying out any
investigative or prosecutorial work because the primary jurisdiction state is
doing so. This option is no longer available to Uganda in view of its selfreferral. Indeed, Uganda itself has submitted before the ICC Pre-Trial
Chamber that, in view of its inability to arrest Kony and his colleagues, the
country has not conducted domestic proceedings in the case.169 However,
Uganda has prevaricated on the issue with senior government officials,
including President Museveni, suggesting that if the LRA were to sign the
final peace deal, Uganda would ask the ICC to withdraw the arrest
warrants.170
The second variant of the admissibility challenge contained in Article 17
takes place ex post, i.e., after the completion of domestic proceedings. This
variant, which invokes the ne bis in idem principle, is to the effect that
national proceedings have already taken place and, therefore, that it would be
unfair to try the accused a second time for the same conduct.171 In order for
Uganda to successfully invoke this variant of the admissibility challenge, and
if the ICC were to grant such a challenge, Uganda must show that national
trials of the LRA were credible, fair, not intended to shield particular
individuals from responsibility, and conducted in accordance with
international standards.
In addition to the procedural options available to Uganda, the ICC
Prosecutor also has the power under Article 53 of the Rome Statute to
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discontinue or reconsider ongoing investigations or prosecutions.172 The
Rome Statute confers discretion on the Prosecutor to determine, upon review
of information made available to him, that he lacks a reasonable basis to
proceed with an investigation or prosecution.173 Such a conclusion could be
based on the Prosecutor’s determination, following a review of “the gravity
of the crime and the interests of the victims” that ICC prosecution would not
be in “the interests of justice.”174 Therefore, the Rome Statute itself provides
for a consequentialist analysis of international prosecution. Arguably, the
need to secure a peaceful settlement and an end to human suffering that
comes with violent conflict or war, provides sufficient reason to invoke the
Prosecutor’s Article 53 powers.
However, the ICC Prosecutor has argued “that there is a difference
between . . . the interests of justice and the interests of peace and that the
latter falls within the mandate of institutions other than the Office of the
Prosecutor.”175 The paper also makes clear that the Prosecutor’s exercise of
the discretion conferred by Article 53 is of a limited and exceptional nature,
which will be guided by the presumption in favor of prosecution, as well as
“by the objects and purpose of the Statute” in fighting impunity for serious
international crimes.176
As regards the Prosecutor’s power to reconsider the decision to
investigate or prosecute on the basis of new facts or information, it can be
argued that a successful domestic trial of the LRA could provide such new
facts or information and, thus, justify a decision to drop the warrants against
the LRA. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the ICC Prosecutor
would want to leave this option available, observe the domestic proceedings
in Uganda when they take place, and then decide at a later date whether to
apply to the Pre-Trial Chamber to drop the arrest warrants. It is further
suggested that this approach could be a useful tool to maintain pressure on
the Ugandan government to ensure a credible accountability process for the
LRA leadership.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Uganda situation is complex and multi-faceted. A long, drawn-out,
violent, internal conflict has eluded peaceful resolution despite various
172
173
174
175
176
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domestic and international initiatives. There is no question that those
responsible for committing serious international crimes in the course of this
conflict must be brought to justice. It is interesting that the international
accountability process set in motion in 2003 through Uganda’s self-referral
appears to have produced a welcome, albeit unforeseen, willingness of the
LRA to negotiate peace. This apparent willingness by the LRA to negotiate
peace has led to an agreement that they will face domestic accountability
instead of trial at the ICC. However, the LRA’s failure to sign on to the final
peace deal has raised questions about their real motives and commitment to
peace. Given the rebel group’s failure to end hostilities and submit to
domestic accountability, it appears as though they are merely buying time to
continue to wreak havoc on the civilian population in Northern Uganda and
beyond. The LRA’s stance has, therefore, left the provisions on domestic
accountability contained in the Agreement and Annexure hanging in the
balance. In addition, the failure of Uganda and its neighbors, such as Sudan
and the Democratic Republic of Congo, to arrest Kony or otherwise convince
him to surrender for trial has left the ICC warrants in the air without
indication if and when they can be meaningfully enforced.
Despite the current situation, it would be unwise to insist upon Haguebased trials of the LRA at all costs. Given the domestic peace imperative,
the large domestic constituency that continues to advocate for accountability
options other than the ICC, the fact that most of the evidence and victims are
located in Uganda, and the comforting fact that Uganda has a functioning
legal and judicial system in place, Uganda-based trials offer the best prospect
of securing both peace and justice in the LRA case. Yet, it must be
emphasized that now is not the time to drop the ICC arrest warrants. As long
as the LRA continues to hold out in the jungles of the Democratic Republic
of Congo, the ICC warrants must be kept in place as an incentive for them to
fully commit to a peace process and benefit from domestic accountability.
Similarly, even assuming that the LRA leaders surrender at some point in the
near future, the warrants must be kept in place during the pendency of any
ensuing national trials so as to encourage the Government of Uganda to
ensure fair and credible trials that meet international legal standards.
Presumably, credible and genuine domestic trials of the LRA leaders would
contribute to the realization of the international community’s objective of
fighting impunity and promoting accountability for serious violations of
international law, while at the same time providing a basis for sustainable
peace and reconciliation in Uganda.
As matters stand, there are no winners in the Ugandan situation. The
justice processes in both Uganda and the ICC are hamstrung by their failure
to arrest Kony and his commanders. The continuing ability of the rebel
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leadership to evade justice does not serve the call of Uganda’s government
and people for a peaceful end to the war. Due to the conflict, victims
continue to suffer from an environment of terror and deprivation; the ICC’s
credibility hangs in the balance because of the perception that the arrest
warrants constitute an impediment to a final peace settlement; and the
international community’s objective of fighting impunity and ensuring
accountability for the grave crimes committed in Uganda stays in perpetual
abeyance.
Given these circumstances, perhaps the ICC would do well to content
itself with the fact that the existence of the arrest warrants has produced a
shift in the bargaining positions of the rebel leadership and, presumably, a
better disposition on the rebels’ part to end the war and face accountability in
domestic courts. This can only be a sign of the relative effectiveness of the
ICC regime. After all, positive complementarity must account for the effect
of the Rome Statute in spurring genuine and effective domestic prosecutions
for grave violations of international law. That complementarity would lead
to such an outcome was the dream and desire, in other words, the intent of
the founders of the Rome Statute. It would be consistent with that intent to
pay heed to the delicate political and legal landscape in Uganda by
supporting the domestic accountability process—at least for the time being.

